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Abstract 
What is the subjective value assigned to information? 
Is the subjective value of information similar to the 
realistic or normative value, or are there deviations 
introduced by human processing, the framing of the 
information source, or  the external qualities of packaging 
and ownership of the information?  Do people assess 
information as having the same value when offered the 
chance to sell it (Willingness to Accept, WTA) as when 
facing the need to buy it (Willingness to Purchase, WTP)?  
This is an empirical, experimental investigation of the 
effects of expertise vs. content, and copy vs. exclusive 
original packaging of information on the WTA/WTP ratio. 
In an animated computer simulation of a business game 
players maximize their profits by making choices 
regarding inventory and prices. Participants were also 
offered the chance to bid in trade (buy or sell)  information 
regarding the weather that may affect demand. We find, as 
hypothesized, that the subjective value of information 
does indeed follow the predictions of Endowment Effect 
theory. Participants revealed a ratio of Willingness to 
Accept to Willingness to Purchase (WTA/WTP) that 
resembles the ratio common in the case of private goods.  
In the decisions, choices and performance recorded for the 
294 subjects, we also found support for the hypothesis that 
the WTA/WTP  diverges from unity more often and in a 
more pronounced manner for information traded in the 
“original” form rather than as a copy of the original, 
although even for copies the WTA/WTP ratio is still 
double.  Results yield a value of about three for the 
WTA/WTP ratio for original information regardless of 
whether the source is content or expertise.  Valuations of 
content and expertise did not diverge.  However,  the 
source of information can be manipulated by system 
design to become more salient.  Copy information 
received a subjective value which was significantly 
different (lower) than original information. Implications 
for both online trading and online sharing of information 
are discussed. 
 
1. Introduction  
 One of the central subjects of trading in e-business is 
information itself.  E-business thrives on both the 
availability and the exchange of information in various 
forms.  Every commercial transaction involves transfer of 
information. Commercial transactions usually involve not 
just the item being traded (books, CDs, antiques etc.) but 
accompanying information as well.  Information is a 
unique good since use and access rights are often 
transferred by copying without the transfer of exclusive 
ownership rights.  Similarly, expertise is transferred by 
copying since it does not leave the expert’s mind.  An 
exception may be when an expert provides exclusive 
advice and will not share or sell it again.  Information and 
expertise can be transferred both by sharing (advice 
giving) and by trading.  Since information exchange has 
become an integral part of e-business, the value of 
information must be part of the total transaction value 
estimate.  Lack of sufficient information creates 
uncertainty which in turn leads to under trading of the 
goods traded.  Hence, information is a catalyst to 
economic activity.   
 So far information was discussed in the general sense 
of the word.  Some definitions are in order before 
proceeding.   Three closely-related concepts are defined:  
Data, information, knowledge.  Different definitions can 
be found in the literature for these terms from an 
information systems perspective [1, 2] or from an 
economic perspective [3-5].  The definitions used here 
were adopted from the knowledge management literature 
[6].  While more complex and detailed definitions are 
available (for example, [7]), the following definitions have 
been selected because they are fairly simple and 
parsimonious and enable operationalization.  Data are 
discrete, objective facts about events.  Information is 
analyzed and/or contextualized data. Information carries a 
message and makes a difference as perceived by the 
receiver.  Knowledge or expertise is a human quality that 
builds on data and information together with experience, 
values, and insight.  In this study we focus on two 
instantiations of  information: information as content and 
information as expertise. Content is the more tangible of 
the two.  
 The value of information is enigmatic. Information is 
neither a private nor a public good. It is an experience 
good.  The main focus of this paper is to offer a way to 
assess the value of information as content and expertise.   
 The present research proposes to investigate the 
subjective value of information and expertise by 
combining economic and psychological theory with 
information systems research.  We use an 
experimental/simulation approach to suggest possible 
approaches to evaluating the intangible, subjective value 
of information. 
 
2. The Value of Information 
 Several unique characteristics render information 
difficult to valuate.  Information is an unusual good in 
many aspects - production, distribution, cost, and 
consumption.  Information is both an end-product and an 
input into the production of other goods, decisions, or 
information.  It often accompanies market goods as an 
integral part. For example, an increasing portion of all 
consumer goods are accompanied by user manuals.  Our 
purchasing decision may also be based on the availability 
of expert advice and recommendation. 
 Information is expensive to produce and cheap to 
reproduce [3, 4].  In fact, distribution is accomplished 
mainly by reproduction or copying.  The same content can 
be distributed by different media, and the price is often 
derived from the medium rather than from the value 
delivered by the content itself.  In point of fact, people 
consume information both by sharing and by purchasing, 
while most other goods are consumed mostly by 
purchasing.   The cost of information can be either direct  
or indirect.  The quest for the value of information is 
further complicated by the fact that information is an 
experience good, meaning that its value is revealed only 
after consumption [4, 8].   
 The value of information can influence the value of 
objects of commerce, therefore, we set out to investigate 
the value of information and expertise as a first step of a 
broader question relating to the influence of the 
availability of information on trading market goods. 
Theoretically, there are three ways to assess the value 
of information [1, 9]: Normative, realistic, and subjective.   
While user utility should be the base for calculating the 
price of information, utility varies by person and 
circumstance.  Realistic methods are ex post and 
consequently  inappropriate for evaluating information 
content (also referred to as the “inspection paradox”) [8].  
We  therefore focus on the subjective value of 
information.   
The tradition of studying decision-making under 
uncertainty has addressed patterns of information use and 
the value assigned to information. This literature sets the 
backdrop for understanding information business trends. 
The heuristics  experiments [10] as well as later studies 
[11] demonstrated that people tend to ignore available 
information such as prior probabilities, sample size and 
the like.  Instead,  decisions are based on other subjective  
methods such as representativeness, availability, and 
adjustment and anchoring (also known collectively as 
heuristics).  Earlier experiments have also shown that 
people tend to be conservative and undervalue information 
available for the revision of a prior opinion [12].  A recent 
study [13] tested the pursuit of information for daily 
decisions.  Participants preferred to seek information and 
to base their choices on (objectively) noninstrumental  
information.  In other words, people assigned positive 
subjective value to objectively worthless information.  
Theory also suggests that people seek information because 
it seems the right thing to do [14], implying over-demand 
for  information and a high subjective value.   People tend 
to accumulate information “just in case” they may need it 
in the future, again leading to excessive demand [8].  The 
theoretical tension is, therefore, between  studies 
indicating that information is under-valued and  research 
showing that information to be over-valued.   
   
2.1 The Endowment Effect   
Subjective value has been studied experimentally for 
many types of market goods (also called private goods) 
and nonmarket goods (also called public goods).  One very 
interesting finding of experimental research on subjective 
value is the discovery of a disparity between the highest 
amount one is willing to pay (WTP) for a good and the 
lowest amount one is willing to accept (WTA) as 
compensation for giving up the same good.  This disparity 
was coined as the Endowment Effect (EE) [15, 16].  
Traditional economic assumptions imply that, when 
income effects are eliminated, the difference between 
WTP and WTA should be negligible (the difference 
should amount to the decreasing marginal utility).  
However,  experiments with various types of goods have 
shown that WTA is significantly greater than WTP.  By 
definition,  WTA and WTP values are neither normative 
nor realistic.  Instead,  they are subjective values, since 
they represent an individual’s personal perception of an 
object’s worth for him or herself.   The EE methodology 
itself is designed with the purpose of eliciting submissions 
of private values and is described in section 3.2 below.  
We apply the WTA/WTP methodology as used for various 
types of goods in order to investigate the subjective value 
of information with a view to determining what 
characterizes information as a good. 
 
2.2 The WTA/WTP Disparity   
The consistent, unexpectedly large and uni-directional 
difference between WTA and WTP observed in relation to 
traditional goods and services has generated much 
research interest. Attempts were made to  explore whether 
the discrepancy can be explained by economic theory or 
whether the difference belongs to the realm of less than- or 
bounded- rational choice and is rooted in psychological 
origins.  We will summarize some of the pertinent 
literature on the WTA/WTP disparity and the explanations 
offered by economists and psychologists highlighting the 
common denominators of these two approaches.  
Commonly,  bidding is employed as the general 
experimental approach for researching the values of WTA 
and WTP . Participants in experiments are offered the 
opportunity to bid for the purchase of an item, or to state a 
reserve price for the sale of an item.  There are many 
bidding mechanisms and there is no specific experimental 
design common to all the experiments described below.  A 
comprehensive methodological review detailing the types 
of bids used in different papers can be found in [17].  
Using the various bidding mechanisms, researchers have 
demonstrated a significant disparity to exist between the 
values of WTA and WTP for common market goods such 
as chocolates, pens, and mugs [18, 19], and a much larger 
disparity with regard to nonmarket goods such as health 
[15, 20].  Trading induced-value tickets, or tokens of 
known value, have not shown a WTA/WTP disparity  [18, 
21, 22]. Induced value tickets or tokens are characterized 
by having only pure monetary value.  In this case, of 
“induced value”  items, the expected number of trades 
took place, the expected number of trades being half of all 
possible trades.  Herein lies one of the important 
implications of the disparity, namely that the existence of a 
significant difference between WTA and WTP leads to a 
reluctance to trade and results in undertrading.  This was 
further confirmed by trading induced-value tickets of 
unknown value [21, 22] as well as lottery tickets [23, 24], 
which resulted in a WTA/WTP disparity and 
undertrading.   Interestingly, uncertainty was not the cause 
for the disparity observed in the mugs experiment [18], 
since the bids were made on mugs marked with  clearly 
visible  price labels. 
The studies mentioned here as well as dozens of others 
[17] reveal a continuum ranging from induced (known) 
value tickets, where WTA is found to equal  WTP, through 
market goods, where the disparity exists, and on to 
nonmarket goods where the disparity is largest. The 
WTA/WTP ratio approaches unity  for induced value 
items, being usually about 3 for market goods, while for 
nonmarket goods that ratio is very large, usually about 10. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation of the WTA/WTP 
Disparity 
The main psychological explanations of the 
WTA/WTP disparity are loss aversion [18, 19, 25] which 
is based on Prospect Theory [26], and the degrees of 
similarity and uncertainty in the cases of induced value 
tokens and lottery tickets [23, 24].    The main economic 
explanations are the substitution effect [20, 27], the 
tradeoff between the price of information and the expected 
payoff [28] and intrinsic value [29].   
The Prospect Theory approach received experimental 
economic substantiation [30].    Similarity observed in 
psychological experiments [31] is equivalent to 
economists’ explanations of the substitution effect.  
Psychologists also acknowledged that lack of 
commensurability is necessary for the EE to manifest itself 
[18], again a hint for the substitution effect.  The immunity 
of induced value tickets to the Endowment Effect also 
supports the substitution effect explanation as such tickets 
have perfect substitutes when their values are known.  The 
degree of uncertainty or the amount of information 
provided have also been researched both by psychologists 
and by economists.  The results in all cases show similar 
trends.  Psychological theory proposed in order to explain 
the WTA/WTP disparity is based on observations of 
human behavior.  This is in line with economic models, 
which in this area of research are inductive and based on 
experimental markets rather than on traditional economic 
assumptions.  Overall it can be said that economic and 
psychological research are moving in the same direction, 
thus lending support to each other.  The main underlying 
causes of the EE seem to be loss aversion and the 
substitution effect with their respective outgrowths.  
Variables that influence the EE are the type of good traded 
(induced-value, market, nonmarket) and the existence and 
availability of substitutes, which imply the availability of 
information on the market. 
 
2.3 Implications for the Subjective Value of 
Information   
A choice to pursue information for decision making is 
a result of the desire to reduce the uncertainty that 
characterizes certain decisions.  Information in this sense 
is not a regular consumer good; it is more like a raw 
material consumed in the production of other goods down 
the value chain.  The decisions as to what kind of 
information will aid in reducing the uncertainty, where to 
look for information, and what is the information worth 
are in themselves made under uncertainty.  One rarely 
knows in advance what kind of information one will find, 
what will be the quality of that information, and to what 
extent will it actually reduce uncertainty.  All this stems 
from the fact that information is an experience good, the 
value of which is revealed only after consumption and 
from a lack of access to meta-information.  Research that 
would shed light on the value of information prior to 
consumption or what influences value formation will be of 
importance to information consumers, content providers, 
decision makers, and information system designers.  
The result of the WTA/WTP disparity, or of the EE, is 
that it creates undertrading.  Fewer trades take place than 
should have occurred under standard economic 
assumptions.  As cited earlier, lack of information 
contributes to an increase in the WTA/WTP divergence 
and hence leads to undertrading.  Conversely, abundance 
of information suggests an accelerated pace of trade.  
Information is an economic catalyst.  Increasing its 
perceived value and the demand for it should be the 
objective of any market-oriented organization in wishing 
to increase the number of trades.  Since information is 
often a crucial  component of market goods,   enhancing 
the value of that information would enhance the overall 
value of the goods and  diminish undertrading. 
Substitution effect theory should predict a large 
WTA/WTP disparity for information.  This is due to its 
inherent nature as an experience good, each item of 
content being unique.  On the other hand, the abundance of 
free information on the Internet and searchers’ inclination 
to seek free content suggest a low subjective value for 
information producing parity between WTA and WTP.  In 
light of this contradiction we have chosen to begin our 
investigation with a fundamental question about the WTA 
and the WTP for information in order to form a basis for 
further research on factors influencing these values and 
other issues of importance.   
Our research questions are: Where is information 
found on the WTA/WTP disparity continuum? Where is 
expertise found on this continuum?  What is the effect of 
originality? In other words, are people sensitive to 
originals versus copy in their valuation of information.  
Our hypotheses are:  H1: The WTA/WTP ratio for 
information (content or expertise) is greater than unity and 
is similar to that of private goods.  H2:  The WTA/WTP 
ratio for content is larger than the WTA/WTP ratio for 
expertise.  H3:  The WTA/WTP ratio for original 
information (content or expertise) is larger than for copy 
information.  H4:  There will be an interaction between the 
source of information (content or expertise) and its 
originality (original or copy). 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Research Instrument 
A Java-based animated computer simulation of an 
easy-to-understand business game called “The Lemonade 
Stand” was used as the experimental instrument.  In this 
simulation the player owns a lemonade stand and must 
operate it so as to maximize his/her profits  by  selling  to 
passers-by.  Information about expected weather and 
assumptions about its effect on demand may affect choices 
regarding inventory and prices. Participants are offered 
the chance to trade (buy or sell) this information, in 
addition to making decisions about inventory and prices. 
A detailed description of the simulation game can be 
found in previous manuscripts [32-34]. 
 
3.2 Procedure 
The experiment was launched by  a detailed in-class 
presentation of the simulation along with handouts that 
consisted of the instructions and sample screenshots.  A 
prize was offered to the player who would achieve highest 
profits.  Participants were told that profits could be made 
in two ways: 1.  By trying to optimize the inventory, 
lemonade quality, and price per cup depending on the 
weather data (if available).  2. By trading information 
(selling generates direct income, while buying information 
can generate indirect payoffs  if played wisely). 
A full description of the experimental session can be 
found elsewhere [32, 34, 35].  Market prices of the 
information trades were built into the simulation but were 
not known or revealed to the players.  They were only told 
that market prices were to be  determined randomly and 
that trades would be executed at market prices if the bids 
they offered were acceptable.  This was done to ensure 
incentive compatibility according to the 
Becker-Degroot-Marschak  principle [36], known in the 
literature as the BDM method. In BDM,  trade takes place 
only if bids are compatible with current market prices. 
BDM is therefore a useful method in eliciting private 
values and is a popular tool in studies of the Endowment 
Effect.  
Participants: Two hundred and ninety four students in 
two groups of, respectively,  one hundred and fifty and one 
hundred and forty four participated in the experiment as 
part of a class requirement.  One group was presented with 
information as content, the other group was presented with 
information introduced as expertise.  Participants were 
told, variably, about the origin of the information as being 
either a  document or a human expert. Within each group 
the order of presentation of bids changed according to a 
Latin Square so that some participants received the buying 
scenario first while others received the selling scenario 
first.  Each participant had four opportunities to bid:  Buy 
original, sell original, buy  copy, sell copy.  The 
experimental design was, therefore 2X2X2: Buy vs. Sell; 
Original vs. Copy and Content vs. Expertise.   
The players were seated in a computer lab with an 
individual computer for each player.  They were not 
allowed to interact with each other but were allowed to ask 
the experimenter for clarifications.  The experiment 
yielded one value for each type of bid for the weather 
information for each participant.  The entire experiment 
lasted an hour and a half, which included the presentation, 
the warm-up games, and the four games with bidding. 
A brief introduction to the game, a Powerpoint 
presentation, and a link to the game itself are available at:  
http://gsb.haifa.ac.il/~draban/lemonade/ 
 
4. Results  
 This section details the results received in the EE 
experiments.  These results reflect data collected from two 
hundred and ninety four (294) students who provided their 
private value bids for buying and selling information as 
described in section 3.2.  The data from the four groups of 
each of the two levels of the independent variable ‘source’ 
(content and expertise) have been combined for the 
analysis that follows.  This analysis has been performed in 
order to test hypotheses H1-H4 listed in Section 2.3. 
 Explanation of acronyms used in the tables that follow: 
WTP – Willingness to pay for original weather 
information 
WTA – Willingness to accept payment for original weather 
information 
WTPC – Willingness to pay for a copy of weather 
information 
WTAC – Willingness to pay for a copy of weather 
information 
WTA/WTP – EE ratio for original information 
WTAC/WTPC –EE ratio for copy information 
 
H1:  The WTA/WTP ratio for information (content or 
expertise) is greater than unity and is similar to that of 
private goods.   
 To test this hypothesis one sample t-tests were 
performed to compare the mean ratios of content and 
expertise with the values of one and three.  Table 1 
summarizes the findings of these tests for original and 
copy content and expertise. 
 
Table 1: Results for one-sample t-tests comparing the 
means of the ratios for original and copy content and 
expertise to values of 1 and of 3. 
 
Test Value=1 Test Value=3  Mean 
Ratio 
Std. 
Dev. t Sig. t Sig. 
Orig. 
Cont. 2.79 3.45 6.37 0.00 -0.73 0.46 
Orig. 
Expt. 2.74 3.01 6.95 0.00 -1.03 0.31 
Copy 
Cont. 2.04 2.76 4.60 0.00 -4.27 0.00 
Copy 
Expt. 1.85 2.27 4.53 0.00 -6.07 0.00 
 
 
 Table 1 clearly shows that the mean ratios for original 
content and expertise are significantly different than unity.  
The mean ratios for original content and expertise are not 
significantly different from three while the same ratios for 
copy of content or expertise are significantly different 
(lower) than 3.   Additional analysis revealed that the 
ratios for copy content and expertise are not significantly 
different from a value of two. 
 
H2:  The WTA/WTP ratio for content is larger than the 
WTA/WTP ratio for expertise.  
 To test this hypothesis independent samples t-tests were 
performed to compare the mean ratios of content and 
expertise.  Table 2 summarizes the findings of these tests 
for original and copy content and expertise. 
 
Table 2: Results for independent samples t-tests 
comparing the means of the ratios for original and 
copy content and expertise. 
 
 Mean Ratio 
Std. 
Dev. t Significance 
Original 
Content 2.79 3.45 
Original 
Expertise 2.74 3.01 
-1.33 0.89 
Copy 
Content 2.04 2.76 
Copy 
Expertise 1.85 2.27 
-0.62 0.54 
 
 Table 2 shows that the mean ratios for original and copy 
content and expertise do not  significantly differ, meaning 
that participants did not assign different values to different 
sources of information.   
 
H3:  The WTA/WTP ratio for original information 
(content or expertise) is larger than for copy information. 
 To test this hypothesis a paired samples t-test was 
performed to compare the mean ratios of original content 
and expertise and copy content and expertise.  Table 3 
summarizes the findings of the test of the independent 
variable ‘originality’ 
 
Table 3: Results for a paired samples t-test comparing 
the means of the ratios for original and copy content 
and expertise. 
 
 Mean Ratio 
Std. 
Dev. t Sig. 
Original 
Content and 
Expertise 
2.77 3.24 
Copy Content 
and Expertise 1.95 2.53 
3.64 0.00 
 
 Table 3 reveals that original information is valued 
significantly higher than copy information. 
 
H4:  There will be an interaction between the source of 
information (content or expertise) and its originality 
(original or copy). 
 To test this hypothesis a univariate ANOVA was 
performed to compare the variances of original content 
and expertise ratios and copy content and expertise ratios 
and to test for interaction effects between the independent 
variables, source and originality.  Table 4 summarizes the 
findings of the test of the independent variable 
‘originality’ 
 
Table 4: Results for a univariate ANOVA comparing 
the variances of the ratios for original and copy 
content and expertise and the interactions between 
them. 
Independent Variable F Sig. 
Originality 11.74 .00 
Source .24 .63 
Originality*Source .08 .78 
 
 Table 4 shows that while different levels of originality 
bear a significant influence on private values, there is no 
significant difference attributed to the source of 
information.  This is in agreement with findings shown in 
Table 2.  In addition, Table 4 shows there is no interaction 
effect between the two independent variables, originality 
and source.  Originality is significant  regardless of the 
source.  The value attributed to a specific source does not 
change with different levels of originality. 
 
3. Discussion  
 Based on performance in a simulated business 
management task we have found, as hypothesized, that the 
subjective value of information does indeed follow the 
predictions of Endowment Effect theory. Participants 
revealed a ratio of Willingness to Accept to Willingness to 
Purchase (WTA/WTP) that resembles the ratio common in 
the case of private goods. It should be emphasized that this 
ratio should (analytically) approach unity. However, the 
empirically  revealed preference here places this ratio 
elsewhere. Of the 294 subjects, we also found support for 
the hypothesis that the WTA/WTP  diverges from unity 
more often and in a more pronounced manner for 
information traded in the “original” form rather than as a 
copy of the original, although even for copies the 
WTA/WTP ratio is still double. In other words, the 
realization that information is owned exclusively 
attenuates the Endowment Effect. 
 Another way to examine the same result is to state that 
exclusive access to information, that is enforceable by  
information systems (such as information security, 
encoding, etc.) might strengthen the endowment effect on 
subjective valuation of information. 
 The high variance of the ratios for copy information 
occurred in part as a result of a large number of people 
submitting bids which resulted in ratios smaller than one.  
This is an interesting observation because it means that 
participants realized that they could make a quick profit 
from selling information which they could later still use 
for themselves.  This indicates a very good understanding 
of the game rules.  Further statistical analysis of the initial 
data confirmed our findings.  When comparing the ratio 
components, WTA for expertise with WTA for content, as 
well as WTP for expertise and for content no significant 
differences are observed although values for expertise 
were always higher than for content.  WTAC for expertise 
and content have been found to have a statistically 
significant difference (t=2.68; p<.01) and so have WTPC 
for expertise and content (t=2.38; p<.02).  This confirms 
the previous finding relating to the higher value assigned 
to original than to copy information. 
 The trend toward higher value for expertise without 
statistical significance raises some thoughts.  It shows the 
flattening effect of the computer where the typical 
e-business decision maker  has to imagine an expert or a 
document based on text displayed on a screen.  In addition, 
the large bidding scale in this experimental setup induced 
variance.  Participants could place bids between 0 and 100 
dollars for either buying or selling.  The scale is even 
larger considering that decimals were allowed.  Research 
in social science usually involves using a smaller scale 
such as seven-point Likert scales.  The scale was not 
defined by any anchors which provide meaning to specific 
choices.  Again, scales used in social sciences often have 
anchors such as “agree” and “disagree”.  In our scale there 
was no ‘right’ or ‘correct’ answer.  Our scale in effect is a 
one item measure, in contrast to psychological measures 
where several items are used to quantify specific traits or 
constructs. 
 The high variance is in accord with the high uncertainty 
associated with buying and selling experience goods.   The 
value of experience goods is not known a priori and there 
is no indication for it.  Perhaps smaller variance will be 
achieved if a ‘preview’ is made available for the weather 
forecast in our game.  Examples of ‘previews’ for other 
information experience goods include abstracts of articles 
and film previews.   
 If we look at the same issue from a different angle, in 
electronic commerce bidding is always a one item measure.  
This characteristic can be manipulated.  For example, a 
wide scale without anchors may induce higher bids which 
are in the interest of auction sites. 
 The value assigned to specific information by a certain 
person can vary according to external circumstances. This 
implies that subjective value is inherently unstable.  Social 
science usually aims to identify stable or generalizable 
phenomena.  Here instability is inherent.  External 
circumstances include parameters such as timeliness, form, 
and content[9].  These parameters change per person and 
between people  and are perceived differently especially 
when there is uncertainty about information.   
 While the first and third hypotheses were held up by 
our data, we found no support for the hypothesis regarding 
differences in valuation due to the source of information.  
Attributing the information to expertise or to a document 
had no significant impact on the WTA/WTP ratio.  In other 
words, the subjective value of information is not variously 
affected in these results by the nature of the information. 
This result is surprising as we intuitively assumed a 
difference and because previous research has identified a 
difference [37].  The  difference originally reported in the 
literature was attributed to ownership.  Expertise was 
perceived to be privately owned rather than owned by the 
organization.  Information as product, a computer program, 
was perceived to be more organizationally owned.  
Sharing an organizationally owned information product  
was found to be mediated by prosocial transformation, 
people weighed the social good more than their personal 
benefits.  In other words, according to this research when 
it comes to tacit knowledge, personal ownership supported 
sharing more than organizational ownership.  This finding 
runs contrary to the general consensus in the knowledge 
management literature, which stresses the main difficulty 
as sharing tacit knowledge [6].  Thus, the findings of the 
present study align better with the knowledge 
management  literature than with our specific hypothesis 
H2.  In a later study [38] a product, a computer program, 
was perceived to be organizationally-owned and led to less 
sharing than privately-owned expertise.  Both studies cited 
here were concerned with sharing information while the 
present focus is on trading information.  It seems that 
people may behave differently when sharing information 
than when they are faced with the choices of buying and 
selling information.   
 To summarize, when trading information, as opposed to 
sharing it, people are sensitive to originality but not to the 
source.  When access to some information is limited to a 
privileged few sets of eyeballs, that information is 
accorded or  assigned a high value.  When the information, 
content or expertise, becomes commonplace, its value 
decreases.  Is it possible that the well-known  economic 
concept of  'scarcity' governs our trading behavior as it 
does for other market goods?  Is scarce information valued 
higher than widely-available information?  This would 
mean that either behaviorally or cognitively  people have 
not yet absorbed the concept of 'network economy', that 
information is distributed mostly by copying and its value 
does not necessarily decrease because of that.  On the 
contrary, in a network economy value sometimes increases 
with wider distribution.  The value of software is one such 
example – end-user software is often more valuable as 
more people use it and become dependent on it for 
communicating with other users. 
 Although our findings do not support the distinction 
between content and expertise and the ownership status 
implied by these forms of information cited in previous 
studies, we did find an ownership effect that resonates 
with the studies on information sharing and studies on EE 
in other market goods.  First, an EE was observed and was 
statistically significant.  EE is attributed to ownership 
status in the literature [18, 39].  Secondly, the fact that 
originality played a significant effect in the results shows 
that ownership matters.  If everyone has access then value 
does drop, but if only one person has exclusive 
access/ownership value increases. Of course, ownership 
itself and perceptions of it  can be affected and 
manipulated via system design.  
 A possible explanation for the surprising lack of 
significance of the source variable may perhaps be 
explained by the experimental manipulation.  Both sources 
were explained to the participants textually on screen.  
This uniformity of presentation provided experimental 
control. However, it may be argued that a computer can be 
used to present different forms of information differently.  
Perhaps our 'bare bones' controlled design created a 
flattening effect where any kind of information looks and 
feels the same.  Graphics, sounds, and more elaborate texts 
could have contributed to stronger differentiation between 
both forms of information.  This would be difficult to 
operationalize while keeping experimental control.  
Another way to examine perceptions of types of 
information is to experiment with stronger contrasts.  
Information in our experiment was important for 
estimating market demand for lemonade but perhaps it 
was not perceived as critical information.  Experimenting 
with more critical information may elicit a difference 
between sources.  For example, if a life-or-death situation 
is described as expertise, say a doctor's advice,  it would be 
valued more than content, say an article taken from an  
encyclopedia.  Another topic which is not a life-death 
question but could carry strong implications is investment 
information.  Is analyst advice valued more than an 
information flier distributed by a bank?  Another example 
may be related to professional decisions.  Would we value 
an article we read in a work situation more than seeking an 
expert's advice?  It would be interesting to see if a larger 
gap between EE ratios is revealed with further research,  
running the simulation game varying the criticality of the 
information.  Of course the most obvious path for further 
research is to expand work on sharing information. What 
are the equivalent dimensions to WTA/WTP when sharing 
rather than trading is at stake? 
 Our research shows a value of about three for the 
WTA/WTP ratio for original information regardless of 
whether the source is content or expertise.  The similarity 
between content and expertise may be attributed to some 
extent to the trading  scenario and to some extent to the 
flattening effect of our simulation.  However, some of our 
results indicate that source may become significant 
depending on the degree of criticality, or, in other words, 
source can be manipulated by system design to become 
more salient.  Copy information received a subjective 
value which was significantly different (lower) than 
original information.  This observation invites further 
research into information system users’ perceptions of the 
information economy.  Information systems can be used to 
enhance understanding of network economy  and they can 
be used to manipulate prevailing perceptions.  Finally, 
since the ‘source’ variable did not display statistical 
significance, it came as no surprise that no interaction with 
the ‘originality’ variable was observed.  In summary, 
studying the subjective value of information by using a 
computerized simulation of a simple business game as an 
experimental setting where EE methodology was applied 
proved to be a very productive research line which should 
be further elaborated by future work.  The nature of 
information which is transferred by sharing, not just by 
trading, also invites research which would use a similar 
platform to assess the interplay or interdependence 
between trading and sharing content and expertise. 
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